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Welfare and the New Grounds for Dispensing with Parental Consent to 
Adoption 
 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 
Law School, University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
The Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 received Royal Assent on 15th 
January 2007 and is expected to be brought into force in early 2009.  By and large a 
modernising and tidying statute, it completely replaces the existing Adoption 
(Scotland) Act 1978 without making structural changes to the adoption process, 
other than the abolition of both Freeing Orders and Parental Responsibilities Orders, 
and the creation of a new sub-adoption order, the Permanence Order.  Many existing 
rules are, however, reframed in rather different language and, sometimes, have been 
changed.  This is the case with the grounds for dispensing with parental consent to 
the adoption order, which is the issue that this article will explore in some detail.  In 
particular we will H[DPLQHWKHQHZJURXQGIRUGLVSHQVDWLRQ WKDW WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH
requires it.  It will be suggested that this new ground will have to be interpreted 
narrowly in order to avoid the risk of it being incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The Basic Rule of Consent 
The basic rule of consent, found in s 31 of the 2007 Act, will remain the same as that 
currently found in s 16 of the 1978 Act:  no adoption order may be made over a child 
unless the court is satisfied either that each parent and guardian of the child has 
agreed to the adoption or that his or her consent should be dispensed with on one or 
more of the specified grounds.  Parental consent or dispensation thereof is therefore 
one of the conditions-precedent that must normally be satisfied before the making of 
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an adoption order would be competent.  The requirement for consent is, however, 
worded rather differently in the two provisions.  Section 16(1)(b)(i) of the 1978 Act 
requires that the parent or guardian ³IUHHO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ZKDW LV
involved agrees unconditionally to the making of an adoption order´s 31 of the 2007 
AcWUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHSDUHQWRUJXDUGLDQ³XQGHUVWDQGVZKDWWKHHIIHFWRIDQDGRSWLRQ
RUGHU ZRXOG EH DQG FRQVHQWV WR WKH PDNLQJ RI WKH RUGHU´  Most noticeably, the 
UHIHUHQFH WRDJUHHLQJ ³IUHHO\´KDVEHHQGURSSHG  The word is likely to have been 
unnecessary since forced agreement would not be valid agreement as, for example, 
forced consent to marriage was not valid even before the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006 put that rule on a statutory basis.  A more significant difference in the wording 
between the two adoption statutes is that agreement under the 1978 Act is stated to 
EH DJUHHPHQW WR WKH PDNLQJ RI ³DQ´ RUGHU ZKLOH FRQVHQW XQGHU WKH  $FW LV
FRQVHQWWRWKHPDNLQJRI³WKH´RUGHU7KHXVHRIWKHLQGHILQLWHDUWLFOHin the 1978 Act 
suggests that the consent that is currently required is consent to the mere idea of the 
child being adopted, but the use of the definite article in the 2007 Act will require that 
the parents or guardians consent to the actual adoption that is being proposed.  This 
implies that they must have some knowledge at least of the characteristics of the 
prospective adopters though, perhaps, not necessarily their identity.  This change in 
terminology, good in itself, explains the other difference in wording: the dropping of 
the requirement presently LQWKH$FWWKDWDJUHHPHQWEHJLYHQ³XQFRQGLWLRQDOO\´
Such a requirement is understandable and necessary while it is a hypothetical 
possibility that is being agreed to (so parents are prevented from saying, ³,DJUHHin 
principle to my child being adopted, so long as he is brought up in a particular 
religion, or is adopted by a white PDUULHGFRXSOH´EXW LV VXSHUHURJDWRU\ ZKHQ WKH
actual adoption by the prospective adopter or adopters is what has to be consented 
to by the parents and guardians.  Any further attempt to impose a condition (such as, 
IRUH[DPSOH³,FRQVHQWWR0UDQG0UV6PLWKDGRSWLQJP\FKLOGVRORQJDVWKH\DJUHH
to let me have contact with her´ RXJKW WR EH UHJDUGHG QRW as consent but as a 
negotiating stance.  In reality the parent is saying QRW ³,FRQVHQW LI ´EXW ³, UHIXVH
FRQVHQWXQOHVV´.  A conditional refusal is still a refusal.  
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Grounds for Dispensation Based on Impossibility of Obtaining Parental 
Consent 
Under s 16(2) of the 1978 Act, parental agreement may be dispensed with where the 
SDUHQW RU JXDUGLDQ ³LV QRW NQRZQ FDQQRW EH IRXQG RU LV LQFDSDEOH RI JLYLQJ
DJUHHPHQW´; under s 31(3)(a) and (b) of the 2007 Act parental agreement can be 
dispensed with where the parent or guardian is dead, cannot be found or is 
incapable of giving agreement.  The new Act has dropped the reference to the 
parent or guardian being ³QRWNQRZQ´, but it now includes that the parent or guardian 
is dead.  If a parent is unknown dispensation will still be possible on the ground that 
the parent ³FDQQRWEHIRXQG´: the reason why the parent cannot be found may well 
be that his or her identity is unknown.  The addition of a ground that the parent is 
dead might be seen as being included for the avoidance of doubt, but in truth there is 
no doubt because though a parent who is dead might (on a rather tendentious view) 
be regarded as remaining a parent, he or she is not a parent who has  -  as opposed 
to had  -  SDUHQWDO UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQG SDUHQWDO ULJKWVDQG VR LVQRW D ³SDUHQW´ DV
defined in s 31(15). 
 
Unreasonable Refusal of Consent 
The most important ground for dispensing with parental agreement under the 1978 
Act is that the agreement is being withheld unreasonably (s 16(2)(b)).  This is the 
most fluid and (doubtless for that reason) the most commonly used ground in the 
current law and it has generated an extensive jurisprudence including, importantly, 
the development of the two-stage test for a court determining whether to dispense 
with parental agreement (see in particular Lothian Regional Council v. A 1992 SLT 
858).  This test requires that the court first consider whether or not a ground for 
dispensation exists and secondly, and separately, whether parental agreement 
should indeed be dispensed with.  The finding of a ground for dispensation does not 
oblige the court to dispense with parental agreement.  The unreasonable refusal 
ground has not been repeated in the 2007 Act, but the two-stage test applies to all 
the grounds and it cannot be regarded as having been abolished. 
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Ground Based on Non-fulfilment of Parental Responsibilities 
Section 16(2)(c) and (d) of the 1978 Act provide that if a parent or guardian has 
either persistently failed to fulfil parental responsibilities or seriously ill-treated the 
childWKHQWKHLUFRQVHQWWRWKHFKLOG¶s adoption may be dispensed with.  The parent 
or guardian, it may fairly be said, forfeits the right to a say LQWKHFKLOG¶VIXWXUHLQVXFK
circumstances.  The tone of parental fault implicit in these existing grounds is entirely 
absent from the successor grounds in the 2007 Act, where the focus is on parental 
inability rather than parental failure.  Section 31(4) will allow the court to dispense 
with parental consent when the parent or guardian is unable satisfactorily to 
discharge the appropriate parental responsibilities and parental rights, and is likely to 
continue to be so unable.  There is no blame here, but simply a finding of fact. 
An entirely new ground for dispensation is found in s 31(5), being that the parent or 
guardian has no parental responsibilities or parental rights because they have been 
removed by the making of a permanence order, and it is unlikely that such 
responsibilities and rights will be restored to the parent or guardian.  A permanence 
order that maintains, confers or regulates thHSDUHQW¶VRUJXDUGLDQ¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI
contact (as an ancillary provision to the order under s 82) will not be sufficient to 
activate this ground for dispensation, for it applies only where all parental 
responsibilities and rights have been removed by the order. 
 
The New Welfare-Based Ground 
Section 52 of the English Adoption and Children Act 2002, which came into force at 
the end of 2005, provides only two grounds for dispensing with parental consent: (i) 
that the parent or guardian cannot be found or is incapable of giving consent, and (ii) 
that the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.  The Scottish 
provisions do not follow this deceptively simple language, but s 31(3)(d) of the 2007 
Act does LQWURGXFH³WKHZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOG´DVDJURXQGIRUGLVSHQVLQJZLWK parental 
consent when neither of the grounds in s 31(4) or (5) applies.  At first reading, this 
would seem to suggest that when parents are able satisfactorily to fulfil their parental 
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responsibilities and rights, and their responsibilities and rights have not been 
removed by a permanence order, then their consent may still nevertheless be 
dispensed with because it is in the welfare of the child that this happens.  The 
applicant for dispensation will therefore have a much easier task than under the 
1978 Act because under that statute the applicant must show either parental failure 
to fulfil responsibilities or parental unreasonableness.  Under the 2007 Act, on the 
other hand, the applicant who is unable to establish parental inability to fulfil 
responsibilities might nevertheless rely on welfare as justifying dispensation.  This is 
a substantial change in the law, for the mere fact that adoption would be in the 
FKLOG¶VZHOIDUHhas never until now been regarded as sufficient to justify dispensation 
(AB v. C 1977 SC 27, per Lord President Emslie at 31; AH & PH, Petrs 1997 Fam 
LR 84, per Lord Marnoch at para 16.04; Central Regional Council v. M 1991 SCLR 
300, per Lord McCluskey at 302).   
This VKLIWIURPSDUHQWV¶ULJKWVWRFKLOGUHQ¶VZHOIDUH is highly problematic, for it is to be 
remembered that welfare is the test to be applied in determining whether, once a 
ground for dispensation has been established, parental consent should in fact be 
dispensed with (the second limb in the two-stage test set out in Lothian Regional 
Council), as well as the test for whether an adoption order is to be made at all.  
Section 14(3) of the 2007 Act requires the court ³to regard the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of the child throughout tKH FKLOG¶V OLIH DV WKH SDUDPRXQW
consideration´.  Once welfare becomes also the ground for dispensation itself, an 
adoption order may only be made if the court finds that (i) the welfare of the child 
requires parental consent to be dispensed with (i.e. that the ground in s 31(3)(d) 
exists), (ii) the welfare of the child requires parental consent to be dispensed with 
(i.e. that dispensation is justified under s 14(3)), and (iii) the welfare of the child 
requires him or her to be adopted (again, s 14(3)). 
The problem is that, by asking the same question at stages (i) and (ii), two logically 
separate questions are conflated into one.  Worse, stages (ii) and (iii) are also 
conflated with the result that dispensation itself becomes entirely meaningless.  For it 
is impossible to envisage a circumstance in which welfare would require the door to 
adoption be opened but at the same time require that adoption itself be refused.  And 
if dispensation of consent becomes meaningless then so too does consent itself.  
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The whole adoption process would then be determined by the single consideration of 
the welfare of the child.  Some may argue that this is as it should be, but this 
argument needs to be resisted, for the unfashionable reason that parents have rights 
too.  A parent who is perfectly able satisfactorily to fulfil parental responsibilities and 
exercise parental rights and who refuses to consent to adoption on reasonable and 
rational grounds has at the moment the legal power under the 1978 Act to prevent 
the adoption going ahead.  If welfare is the sole test under the 2007 Act then that Act 
takes away this right of the competent and reasonable and satisfactory parent, and 
as such renders the right to refuse a meaningless process, devoid of any effect. 
It is difficult to see how it could be compatible with art 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights for adoption to be permitted against the wishes of a competent and 
reasonable and satisfactory parent with whom the child has enjoyed family life.  
Adoption, a process that necessarily breaks existing family ties, is always an 
interference with the right to family life, protected by art 8(1) of the Convention, and 
as such always needs to be justified as being necessary in a democratic society in 
terms of art 8(2).  In other words, adoption is Convention-compliant only when it is a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  Now, child welfare is always a 
legitimate aim, but the complete destruction of the existing parent-child relationship 
in order to create a new one is not always a proportionate means of achieving that 
aim.  The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child needs also to be remembered.  
Article 7 of the UNCRC SURWHFWVWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWWREHFDUHGIRUE\KLVRUKHUSDUHQWV; 
art 8 provides that a child has a right to respect for his or her identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations; and art 9 gives the child the right not to be 
separated from his or her birth parents.  These various provisions do not prohibit 
adoption, for none is absolute, but they do mean, as art 8(2) of the ECHR does, that 
sound and substantial reasons are needed before it is legitimate to take away these 
rights, to change that identity and to disrupt these relationships  ³6RXQG DQG
VXEVWDQWLDO´ PHDQV VRPHWKLQJ beyond tKH VLPSOH IDFW WKDW WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH LV
served thereby, for the following reason. 
The welfare test is seldom one that pits good against evil, but is rather designed to 
identify the best alternative out of sometimes many more or less acceptable choices.  
It is a test that is ideal for balancing different options none of which is actually 
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harmfuOEHFDXVHLWLVWKHRQO\VWDQGDUGWKDWSXWVWKHFKLOG¶VLQWHUHVWVDQGZHOOEHLQJ
before those of any of the disputants.  But the justification for state interference in 
family life is risk of harm and not balance of options, especially when the interference 
takes as radical a form as adoption.  Identifying where WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH lies is not 
the same as identifying a harm that the state may legitimately seek to avoid.  It is 
simply the identification of the best outcome, and the failure to ensure the best 
outcome is not the same as a risk of harm.  It follows that the state has no right to 
effect a permanent removal of a child from his or her family environment merely 
because the best outcome cannot otherwise be provided.  For the choices may be 
between an acceptable outcome and a good outcome, or between a good outcome 
and a better outcome%XWDQDFFHSWDEOHRXWFRPHLVQRW³KDUP´MXVWEHFDXVHDJRRG
outcome is possLEOH DQG D JRRG RXWFRPH LV QRW ³KDUP´ MXVW EHFDXVH D EHWWHU
outcome is possible.  It is a fundamental misapprehension of the welfare test to see 
it as identifying the only acceptable outcome for any child.  In adoption proceedings 
the court has a dual task: to protect the child from danger and to determine between 
different alternatives IRU WKH FKLOG¶V IXWXUH.  These two tasks should never be 
confused, as they would be if the questions of dispensing with parental consent and 
adoption itself were conflated into one question: would the welfare of the child be 
advanced by being adopted? 
The European Court of Human Rights has made plain that a mere application of the 
welfare test  -  the identification of the best alterative  -  is an insufficient justification 
on its own for the implementation of compulsory measures of state intervention.  In 
Olsson v. Sweden (1988) 11 EHRR 259 at para 72 WKH&RXUWVDLG³,WLVQRWHQRXJK
WKDWWKHFKLOGZRXOGEHEHWWHURIILISODFHGLQFDUH´.  In KA v. Finland 14 January 2003 
at para 92 and Haase v. Germany 8th April 2004 at para 95 WKH&RXUWVDLG³7KHIDFW
that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her 
upbringing will not on its own justify a compulsory measure of removal from the care 
of the biological parents; there must exist other circumstances pointing to the 
µQHFHVVLW\¶IRUVXFKDQLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHSDUHQWV¶ULJKWXQGHUDUWWRHQMR\DIDPL\
OLIHZLWKWKHLUFKLOG´$QGLQBuchberger v. Austria 20th December 2001 the Court at 
para 40 made SODLQWKDWWKH&RQYHQWLRQUHTXLUHV³WKDWDIDLUEDODQFHPXVWEHVWUXFN
EHWZHHQ WKH LQWHUHVWV RI WKH FKLOG DQG WKRVH RI WKH SDUHQW´  7KH SDUHQW¶V ULJKW WR
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IDPLO\ OLIH ³PD\´ EH RYHUULGGHQ E\ WKH EHVW LQWHUHVWV RI WKH FKLOG EXW WKLV LV QRW
inevitable  -  a point obscured by but not fundamentally inconsistent with domestic 
ODZ¶V IRFXVRQ WKH ³SDUDPRXQWF\´RI WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH  -  and will be Convention-
compliant only when such overriding is a proportionate response to the risk faced by 
the child.  Removing a child from satisfactory carers is not a proportionate response 
to the fact that these carers are not the best possible carers.  Parents are not obliged 
by any domestic legal system or by the European Convention to provide the best 
alternative for their child, but merely one that is not positively harmful.  Now, the 
making of an adoption order has always, in Scotland, been possible on the mere 
application of the welfare test, but this is acceptable only if some other condition-
precedent addressing risk at an earlier stage and thereby providing a proportionality 
justification to adoption is satisfied.  That role is presently served by the process for 
dispensing with parental consent, which until now has required more than welfare: it 
has required parental absence, or parental unreasonableness, or parental failure.  
To allow that process to be determined by the same welfare test as is applied to the 
making of the adoption order itself is to remove the necessary protection of the 
SDUHQW¶V ULJKW WR IDPLO\ OLIH and as such is contrary to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court referred to above. 
 
Compatibility Solution ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³$SSOLHV´ 
If the above argument is correct, the Scottish court will be obliged to seek an 
interpretation of the dispensation of consent provisions in s 31 that ensures that the 
right to refuse consent is effective, that is to say is capable of being used by 
competent and reasonable and satisfactory parents to prevent an adoption going 
ahead notwithstanding that it is in the welfare of their child (in no higher sense than 
being a better outcome than they themselves could offer their child).  I should like to 
suggest two alternative interpretations of s 31 that might achieve this. 
The first means of achieving Convention compatibility is to limit the scope for 
applying the welfare ground in s 31(3)(d) to circumstances in which the parents are 
unsatisfactory in some way.  Section 31(3)(d) is stated to apply only when ³QHLWKHU
[subss 31(4) nor (5)] applies´.  The section then explicitly states that subs (4) 
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³DSSOLHV´ if three apparently cumulative conditions exist, and the obvious 
interpretation of this is that it does not apply when any one of these conditions 
cannot be established.  But if we are trying to avoid welfare becoming a competent 
ground when parents are satisfactory, this may be achieved by regarding the first 
condition (that the parent has parental responsibilities and rights beyond that of 
merely contact with the child) as the sole competency test for the application of subs 
(4), and regarding the other two conditions (that the parent is unable satisfactorily to 
discharge parental responsibilities, and that the parent is likely to continue to be so 
unable) as the factual basis upon which dispensation under subs (4) is justified.  This 
interpretation would allow the welfare ground for dispensation to be used when the 
parent has, in non-satisfaction of the first condition, no more than the parental 
responsibility and right of contact; but, crucially, would prevent it from being used 
when the parent has full parental responsibilities and, in non-satisfaction of the 
second condition, is satisfactorily able to discharge them.  The non-satisfaction of the 
second (or third) condition in subs (4) should not, in other words, be held to disapply 
subs (4): it should simply mean that the ground for dispensation contained therein 
has not been established to exist. 
Similarly, subs (5) is stated to apply if two conditions exist: (i) that there is a 
permanence order removing all parental responsibilities and rights and (ii) that it is 
unlikely that the parent will reacquire parental responsibilities and rights.  The 
obvious interpretation  -  that the subsection will not apply (and the welfare ground 
therefore activated) when either condition is not satisfied  -  would allow the welfare 
ground to be applied in circumstances in which a parent who has admittedly lost 
parental responsibilities is likely to recover them.  But excluding a parent who is likely 
in the future to be able to give the child an acceptable family life would be 
inconsiVWHQW ZLWK WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW¶V UHSHDWHGO\-expressed view that family 
reunion should, whenever possible, be the ultimate aim of all child care processes 
(see Johansen v. Norway (1997) 23 EHRR 33 at para 78, K & T v. Finland (2001) 31 
EHRR 484 at para 156,  R v. Finland May 30, 2006 at para 89).  This can be 
avoided, as with subs (4), by regarding only the first condition as the competency 
test for the applicability (or non-applicability) of subs (5) and the second condition as 
the basis upon which dispensation under that subsection is justified.  The result 
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would be that it is only when the first condition is not satisfied that subs (5) will ³QRW
DSSO\´DQGWKH welfare ground in s 31(3)(d) activated.  If only the second condition is 
QRW VDWLVILHG WKHQ VXEV  ³DSSOLHV´ EXW LV QRW HVWDEOLVKHG: VLQFH LW ³DSSOLHV´ V
31(3)(d) cannot. 
Putting both restricted interpretations together, the result would be that subss (4) and 
(5) do not apply when the only parental responsibility and parental right held by the 
parent is that of contact and there is no permanence order over the child: this 
becomes the sole factual circumstance in which the welfare ground for dispensing 
with parental consent to adoption may competently be pled.  Using welfare to 
dispense with the consent of a parent in this circumstance is likely to be Convention-
compliant, for such a parent will not be intimately involved in the day to day control of 
WKHFKLOG¶VOLIHDQGKLVRUKHUIDPLO\OLIHZLWKWKHFKild might therefore be deemed to 
be OHVV LPSRUWDQW WKDQ WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH (see Söderbäck v. Sweden (1998) 23 
E.H.R.R. 342). It is to be admitted that this result is achieved only with a rather 
creative, even cumbersome, LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ZRUG ³DSSOLHV´ DV LW DSSHDUV LQ
subss (3), (4) and (5), and by giving that word slightly different meanings depending 
upon which subsection it appears in.  But none of this changes fundamentally the 
meaning of the word as it is variously used and as such is within the interpretative 
power and, it is suggested, duty of the court under s 3 of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
 
&RPSDWLELOLW\6ROXWLRQ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI³:HOIDUH´ 
A second means of ensuring consistency with the European Convention (and one 
which, perhaps, does less to further complicate an already complicated section) is to 
interpret the welfare test in s 31(3)(d) in a different way from the welfare test as it 
appears in s 14(3) of the 2007 Act.  Under s 14(3) the court must regard the need to 
safeguard and prRPRWH WKH ZHOIDUH RI WKH FKLOG WKURXJKRXW WKH FKLOG¶V OLIH DV WKH
paramount consideration.  This allows the court to make the order that is the best of 
the options available, even if the other options are, in themselves, perfectly 
acceptable.  Now, while s 14(1) states that this is to apply whenever the court is 
³FRPLQJWRDGHFLVLRQUHODWLQJWRWKHDGRSWLRQRIDFKLOG´WKLVcannot mean each and 
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every decision that the court is required to make in an adoption application.  An 
implicit limitation is that welfare is paramount only with discretionary decisions, such 
as whether to dispense with consent and whether to make an adoption order, but not 
with decisions of fact (such as who is a parent) or decisions on competency (such as 
whether joint applicants are a ³UHOHYDQW FRXSOH´ LQ WHUPVRI V ).  Whether the 
parent has consented and whether a ground for dispensation exists are both 
questions of fact and competency, since the adoption order cannot be made without 
one or the other.  If so, then the welfare test as it appears in s 14(3) is not applicable 
to the question whether the ground for dispensation in s 31(3)(d) has been made out.  
This allows ³welfare´ in s 31(3)(d) to take on an independent meaning.   
Now, that paragraph (unlike s 14(3)) focuses attention not on one option among 
many acceptable options but on what WKHZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOG³UHTXLUHV´,QP, C and 
S v. United Kingdom  (2002) 35 EHRR 1075 the European Court said this at para 
 ³$V UHJDUGV WKH H[WUHPH VWHS RI VHYHULQJ DOO SDUHQWDO OLQNV with a child, the 
Court has taken WKH YLHZ WKDW VXFK PHDVXUHV « Fould only be justified in 
H[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV RU E\ WKH RYHUULGLQJ UHTXLUHPHQW RI WKH FKLOG¶V EHVW
LQWHUHVWV´7KHXVHRIWKHZRUG³UHTXLUHV´LQVGechoes the European &RXUW¶s 
ODQJXDJH RI ³RYHUULGLQJ UHTXLUHPHQW´, and VR ³ZHOIDUH´ in this context might be 
interpreted to contain ³WKH FRQQRWDWLRQ RI DQ LPSHUDWLYH ZKDW LV GHPDQGHG UDWKHU
WKDQZKDWLVPHUHO\RSWLRQDORUUHDVRQDEOHRUGHVLUDEOH´SHUWall LJ in SB v. County 
Council [2008] EWCA Civ 535 at para 125).  In other words, welfare in s 31(3)(d) 
might be interpreted to ³UHTXLUH´ GLVSHQVDWLRQ ZKHQ WKLV LV the only or most 
efficacious means of protecting the child from a positively harmful outcome.  In this 
way again, the competent and reasonable and satisfactory parent who refuses 
consent will not have that consent dispensed with  -  not because it would be 
incompetent to do so but because the welfare test, in this stricter sense, will not have 
not been satisfied. 
True it is that the Court of Appeal in SB v. County Council expressly rejected the 
DUJXPHQW WKDW ³ZHOIDUH´KDVDQHQKDQFHGPHDQLQJ in s 52 of the English 2002 Act 
(the equivalent to s 31 of the 2007 Act).  But that authority is not persuasive in 
Scotland for a number of reasons.  First, the process for dispensing with parental 
consent in England has always conflated the grounds for dispensation with the 
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question of whether to dispense.  Secondly, and following from this, nowhere does 
the Court of Appeal distinguish between the decision to dispense and the 
assessment of whether there is a ground for dispensation.  And thirdly, the structure 
of the 2002 Act requires (the Court of Appeal held) that the general welfare test in s 
1 thereof applies to the dispensation issue in s 52 while, as shown above, the 
structure of the 2007 Act does not.  The English approach is to regard dispensation 
as inevitable once the ground for dispensation is established (see Re S (Adoption 
Order or Special Guardianship Order) [2007] 1 FLR 819 at para 71), but this has 
never been the case in Scotland (see FB & AB v. AC, (July 10, 1998, Outer House) 
when a ground was held to exist for dispensation but the court did not dispense with 
consent).  The Scottish position requires a two-stage test, with a different test 
applying to eachVLQFHWKHZRUG³ZHOIDUH´LVXVHGLQWKH$FWIRUERWKVWDJHVLW
follows that the word must have a different meaning in each. 
 
Conclusion 
The major change of law in s 31 is to introduce the concept of welfare of the child as 
a distinct ground for dispensing with parental consent to adoption.  But the wording is 
open to different interpretations, some of which avoid the dangers of incompatibility 
with the European Convention.  The two interpretations suggested above are 
probably not the only ones that avoid the welfare of the child being the sole 
determinant of whether or not that child will be adopted.  One or other, or some other 
method of achieving the same end, will need to be adopted by the courts in their 
interpretation of the new Act if competent and reasonable and satisfactory parents 
are to preserve their right, guaranteed by the European Convention  -  and which 
they should have in any case  -  of preventing an adoption which, while desirable, is 
not necessary to protect the child from harm. 
